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Abstract 
Person-centered medicine is emerging as one of the most formidable critiques of evidence-based medicine. One of its claims 
to priority over patient-centered care, humane medicine, narrative-based medicine and values-based medicine is its attention 
to the philosophy of personhood. While it defines personhood in widely accepted terms, using adjectives employed by 
Cassell, such as 'embodied, purposeful, thinking, feeling, emotional, reflective, relational', it offers no examination of the 
numerous debates and disagreements about personhood. In particular, it has not so far explored the tension that exists 
between the neo-Lockean account of persistent psychological attributes, such as intention, cognition and rationality and the 
`animalistic' account that ascribes personhood to human existence, to the human body and brain. Nor has it examined the 
significance of personhood as an emergent property of human beings imbedded in cultures and societies. Medical ontology 
is basically realist and its epistemology empiricist. Person-centered medicine faces the task of translating a contested, 
emergent concept into something realistic and empirically examinable, if it is to persist and have pedagogical purchase. 
Schectman's 'person-life view' may provide a starting point for conceptualisation and teaching and respect is a relationship 
that underpins an understanding of personhood, but other guidelines will be needed. Some relevant suggestions are made in 
this article. 
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Introduction 
Person-centered medicine (PCM) has been launched with 
enthusiasm as an antidote to the threats of evidence-based 
medicine (EBM). If indeed EBM has diminished the 
personal and the humane in medical practice, PCM seeks 
to restore them. It defines itself as an amalgam of EBM 
and patient-centered care [1], capturing the undoubted 
good of both systems, but also bringing something new to 
medical education and practice — the concept of the person. 
But is PCM more than another portmanteau term — like 
EBM, patient-centered care (PCC), narrative-based 
medicine, values-based medicine (VBM) — that will attract 
enthusiasm for a time and then also lose its drawing 
power? The pioneers of PCM seem determined to make 
their vision work and work well because PCM is to have a 
sound theoretical and philosophical grounding. Miles and 
Mezzich, two of the most determined promoters of PCM, 
have written: 
Here, we understand the personhood of the patient and 
of the clinician with Cassell, who defines a person as an 
`embodied, purposeful, thinking, feeling, emotional, 
reflective, relational, human individual always in action, 
responsive to meaning and whose life in all spheres 
points both outward and inward', so that a person's 
behaviour, whether 'volitional, habitual, instinctual or 
automatic', has its genesis from and in meaning ... The 
concept of person within the context of the clinical 
encounter is, then, altogether more richly and vividly 
descriptive than that of patient and recognises that there 
are two individuals within the clinical encounter, the 
person of the patient and the person of the clinician. 
Often and desirably so, a clinical encounter also 
involves the persons in the patient's family [2]. 
PCM [can be described as] a medicine of the person (of 
the totality of the person's health, including its ill and 
positive aspects), for the person (promoting the 
fulfilment of the person's life project), by the person 
(with clinicians extending themselves as full human 
beings, well grounded in science and with high ethical 
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aspirations) and with the person (working respectfully 
in collaboration and in an empowering manner through 
a partnership of patient, family and clinicians) [2]. 
Our terminological use derives not from personal style 
or aesthetic preference, but rather from a philosophical 
understanding of personhood [2]. 
These clarifying statements appear in what seems to be 
an iconic document on person-centered medicine published 
in 2011 [2]. Miles and Mezzich are very clear that they 
seek to ground PCM in a philosophy of personhood (see 
third quote above) and they use Cassell's widely inclusive 
definition for reasons that become clear in the second 
passage quoted above. But Cassell's definition compresses 
a multitude of difficult issues that beset philosophers, 
psychologists, sociologists, anthropologists, legal theorists, 
ethicists and ordinary people relating to one another. What 
qualifies as a person? Are persons the same as human 
beings? Is a foetus a person? Is a severely demented 
individual still a person? Are some non-human animals to 
be regarded as persons? And what constitutes personal 
identity? Is personal identity numerically singular 
throughout a life-course or does change through time mean 
that one life may be led by different persons? If we are to 
accept continuity of the person throughout life, how is that 
continuity to be understood against the changes that affect 
the body and the mind in the course of a life? I will here 
describe the link between personhood and identity and 
review some of the debates about personhood that are of 
relevance to person-centered medicine 
Personhood and identity 
Personhood and personal identity are closely linked and 
the nature of personal identity has been contested. The 
modern formulation of identity begins with Locke [3]: 
...to find wherein personal identity consists, we must 
consider what person stands for; - which, I think, is a 
thinking intelligent being, that has reason and reflection 
and can consider itself as itself, the same thinking thing, 
in different times and places; which it does only by that 
consciousness which is inseparable from thinking and, 
as it seems to me, essential to it: it being impossible for 
anyone to perceive without perceiving that he does 
perceive....Consciousness makes personal identity. 
The Lockean notion of personal identity as defined by 
continuity of consciousness and memory has been 
modified by his inheritors, the neo-Lockeans, to include a 
broader sense of psychological continuities. Contemporary 
debate stands explanation of personal identity in terms of 
this psychological continuity against persistence of 
embodiment [4-7]. There is also a debate concerning the 
relative importance of autonomous agency and social 
determinism in the development of personal identity [8,9]. 
The philosophical debate over the nature of personal 
identity has been summarised by Perry, and is clearly both 
heated and complex [10]. I do not review all of the 
arguments here, except to say that personal identity can be, 
in important ways, defined by embodiment, continuity and  
memory. There is an extensive literature in psychology 
dealing with personhood and its identity [5,7,11-24]. 
Each of us has a personal sense of identity that 
depends in some way on our own memories. We are also 
assigned personal identities by those who know us and we 
remember events that are part of our embodied lives and 
these assigned identities influence our internal sense of 
personal identity. The 'reformed' exterminator from a 
death camp may have the identity of a good citizen for 
those who have only known him since his rehabilitation, 
but he retains the identity of the murderer for those who 
saw him at work during the Holocaust [25]. 
Personhood, then, for our purposes, is the subjective 
and objective identity that places each of us uniquely in 
social context. Brisset and Edgley write: 
Almost all writers using the term imply that identity 
establishes what and where the person is in social terms. 
It is not a substitute word for "self." Instead, when one 
has identity, he is situated — that is, cast in the shape of a 
social object by the acknowledgment of his participation 
or membership in social relations [26]. 
Personhood and personal identity have physical, 
cognitive, emotional and moral dimensions, just as Cassell 
and as Miles and Mezzich say. The sense of personhood is 
also a sense of both the performative and the moral, the 
agentic and the autonomous. Agency and autonomy are 
inextricably linked. The performative category is willed 
and experienced in terms of action and its relational 
consequences. The moral category has components that are 
relational, existential, experiential and ethical. Personhood 
is thus also the sense of agency, the sense of what it is to 
be this willing, choosing and acting entity, as experienced 
by the person and by the people with whom she interacts. 
The breadth of personal identity is captured by 
Hermans and Kempen [15], largely following William 
James: 
The terms I and Me were discerned by James (1890) as 
the two main components of the self. The I is equal to 
the self-as-knower and continuously organizes and 
interprets experience in a purely subjective manner. 
Three features characterize the I: continuity, 
distinctness, and volition...[Hle identified the Me as the 
empirical self that in its broadest sense is described as 
all that a person can call his or her own, "not only his 
body and his psychic powers, but his clothes and his 
house, his wife and children, his ancestors and friends, 
his reputation and works, his lands and horses, and 
yacht and bank account"... 
Its depth is characterised by Lockwood [27]: 
...I would argue that there is, in any case, something 
wrong with the idea that personal identity can be taken 
simply to consist in such connections and continuities as 
are exhibited in consciousness and behaviour. 
Intuitively, one's identity over time is, I would contend, 
conceived of as a deep fact: something we think of as 
lying behind these connections and continuities, 
something of which the latter are merely a 
manifestation... What is happening here, it seems to me, 
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is that personal identity is functioning as a natural kind 
concept. 
Even this brief discussion indicates the complexity, 
depth and breadth of the concept of the person and his 
identity. Given that there are legal, moral, ontological, 
epistemological and psychological dimensions to the 
concept of persons, it seems best to select issues of 
relevance to person-centered medicine, rather than attempt 
to be inclusive. I will concentrate on a major difference 
that has developed between neo-Lockeans, who explain 
personal continuity by psychological connections between 
the remembered and experienced past, present and future 
and the 'animalists', who locate continuity in the human 
body and its brain. Let me from here on use the term 
`person' to include 'personal identity', because it is 'the 
person' who has status in law and moral reflection, who is 
granted dignity and respect in one way or another by civil 
rights and who is the moral agent and patient in his/her 
daily activities. 
Personhood and humanity 
For medicine generally, personhood is linked to being 
human. Neo-Lockeans use certain features of humans to 
define persons. These include cognition and rationality, 
self-awareness, intention and narrativity. They usually 
remain open to the possibility that non-human animals 
(such as dolphins) may be human according to these 
psychological criteria. More extreme 'animalists' assign 
personhood to the living human and his brain. While they 
recognise the complexities of brain function, including 
imagination and intention, they hold that the person can be 
reduced to the human body and its brain and that a person 
no longer exists when the brain ceases to exist. 
There are variations on these themes. Kadlac, for 
example, seeks to 'humanise' personhood by arguing that 
moral status can be given only to humans who are moral 
agents and moral patients [28], where a moral patient is a 
person who is the object of moral judgement from moral 
agents. Kadlac thus situates humanness in the moral 
context of interconnection with other members of the 
community. The individual person must be a moral agent, 
a moral patient, or both and this implies being imbedded in 
groups of other moral agents and moral patients. For 
Kadlac, being a member of the species Homo sapiens is the 
a priori condition of personhood. Moral agency and moral 
patienthood are the further defining conditions. 
Schechtman [29] has taken this argument further in an 
endeavour to connect animalism and personalism in one 
concept. She argues that the practical agency of persons 
has been neglected: 
Most of us are Lockean persons for much of our lives, 
but this is not what we are most fundamentally. The 
idea is that if being a person is defined as possessing the 
capacity for moral agency or prudential reasoning, there 
must be something more fundamental that possesses 
these capacities. 
She points out that, intuitively, we view a severely 
demented human as a person `spatiotemporally continuous 
with the person who was there before.' The human animal 
persists, but the Lockean person has gone. But does this 
mean that this being in the bed is still human or has he 
reverted to a purely animal state, to be considered as 
having a different moral status to a flourishing human 
person with all his faculties and capabilities still active? 
Emphasising the metaphysical, ontological problems 
inherent in dividing the psycho-social from the animal, 
Schechtman formulates a 'person-life view' that attempts 
to reconcile the person to the animal conceptually and 
ethically. 
The person-life view 
Schechtman's person-life view is culturally situated, like 
that of feminists who support the idea of relational 
autonomy [30,31] : 
`...a person-life is lived in a culture and in interaction 
with other persons...there is increasing evidence that 
the kinds of cognitive capacities that distinguish persons 
from other animals depend not just on the capabilities of 
individual human brains, but on the exposure of those 
brains to the appropriate cultural scaffolding.' 
People occupy 'person-space' and they do so 
throughout the trajectory of their lives, a trajectory that 
includes both gain and loss. Most importantly, in 
Schechtman's view, 'there is only one thing throughout a 
human life — a human person — and so there is no difficulty 
in explaining the relation between the two entities' of 
person and human animal. There is also no difficulty in 
explaining the relationships between infant and child, child 
and adolescent, adolescent and adult, adult and old person, 
old person and person demented. All occupy the same 
`person-space' and while a person's social status may 
change from being a dependent to being a resource and 
then back to another kind of dependence, there is no 
difficulty in considering our ethical acknowledgement of 
each stage of the person's life. Within this concept, we 
deal with one person imbedded within a culture. Each 
culture or subculture may have different ways of handling 
the evolution of a person-life, but each will have 
something to say about the significance of the stages, the 
relevant responsibilities of moral agents and the 
expectations of moral patients. The person-life does not 
evolve in isolation and evolves as much by loss as by gain. 
Entropy is an iron law for the many systems that constitute 
the person. 
These arguments have direct relevance for person-
centered medicine. Medicine deals specifically with human 
beings. Veterinary surgeons deal with other animals. 
Therefore, clinicians have already declared themselves as 
`human animalists' from the start. Persons belong to the 
species Homo sapiens and arguments to the contrary 
generally fall outside medical discourse. Medicine deals 
with humankind in its full range from foetus to child to 
adolescent to adult and beyond to age with its concomitant 
declines. It accepts the truths of change, gain and loss and 
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knows the difference between the experience of loss and 
the loss of experience. Dilemmas arise when doctors-as-
persons face intuitive uncertainty. What is the status of a 
foetus, of a man with Alzheimer's beyond communication, 
of a decerebrate boy after an accident? These have some 
unmistakably human form, but no semblance of Lockean 
personhood. Each occupies the space of a human being; 
each has a history or the vestige of a history; each can 
make us uncomfortable because their practical agency is 
absent. Yet they still remain moral patients, the objects of 
our moral concerns and commitments. And doctors are 
persons, moral agents and moral patients themselves, 
involved in interpersonal relationships. Schechtman's 
person-life view offers no ready solutions to such moral 
concerns, but contributes significantly to reflective 
equilibrium [32-34]. The concept of personhood may help 
us to place our patients, their families and ourselves within 
the cultural frameworks that formed us all, may help us to 
express respect for one another and to communicate well, 
but it still leaves a good deal of moral ground to ethicists. 
Personhood as emergence 
Personhood can be considered in other ways. Human 
beings are complex systems, each with a biology that is at 
once shared with others and unique to each individual. 
Each of us, doctor or patient, is imbedded in cultures and 
groups and subgroups and families and diverse friends and 
so on. These are systems too, with rules and relationships 
and complexities. Emergence is recognised in both 
philosophy and systems theory as the appearance of 
unanticipated and novel entities from complex systems 
[35-39]. Spencer-Smith [40] has examined the status of 
ontological and epistemic emergence and concluded that 
emergent novelty may seem to represent an irreduceable 
mystery, but that — if we concede that emergence always 
takes place from a system — there has to be an explanation 
for what has emerged. We accept that water emerges from 
hydrogen and oxygen. At one time in history, water's 
emergence from the mixture was a mystery, only to be 
described, shown to have predictability and reversibility. 
Then it became explicable at the level of atomic and 
subatomic particles. The nature of water and the precise 
reasons why water emerges rather than some other 
substance may resist explanation for longer, but there is no 
reason to think that water itself should always remain an 
inexplicable mystery as levels of understanding reach 
deeper and deeper. 
A similar argument applies to personhood, which 
emerges from the almost infinitely complex systems of 
human being and enculturation. Personhood can be seen as 
something supervenient on the phenomenon of human life 
and sociation. But supervenience always implies 
subvenience, something on which it rests. We may never 
completely explain personhood on a material basis, never 
reduce it to the raw functions of body and brain situated in 
sociation with other bodies and brains. Our understanding 
of personhood is almost certain to change as we continue 
to study it. Its relevance may decrease or increase. 
Reductionism is at best an aspiration in the face of such  
complexity and the intellectual position we are lead toward 
is close to that of non-reductive materialism [41,42]. The 
more we find out, the more we have to explain and the 
more theories we have to construct. The (qualified) free 
will that each of us possesses is under no threat from 
seeing personhood as emergent. The further genomics 
takes us toward the quantum level of understanding, the 
more we enter the realm of 'iron probability', the realm 
where probability dominates inquiry. If truth is warranted 
assertability, then our warrants and our assertions will go 
on changing for as long as we can think and refine our 
measurement techniques [43-46]. We may navigate toward 
physicalist explanations, but we cannot (yet?) reach 
adequate reductive explanations. The person and her 
agency will not reduce to a material base. 
Once again, the emergent nature of personhood has 
implications for person-centered medicine. To say that 
personhood is 'emergent' does little to settle priority 
between being human and possessing Lockean 
characteristics of intention, reason and so on. Ultimately, 
personhood has to be construed as a substantive 
component of medical ontology and epistemology if it is to 
survive and flourish as a component of clinical theory and 
practice. Wulff and colleagues have characterised 
medicine's ontology as realist and its epistemology as 
empiricist [47]. Medicine is also materialist in its scientific 
orientation, while admitting the psyche into such domains 
as suffering, pain and the psycho-somatic. Person-centered 
medicine, if it is to succeed, would therefore need to 
convince medical students and practitioners that 
personhood is not simply an irreducible, emergent and 
insubstantial concept, but that it is real and that it has 
material consequences for the practice of medicine. And 
that will mean minimally that it can be shown to exist, can 
be discursively qualified, used in a therapeutic relationship 
and can be causally related in some way to illness and 
healing. It needs to be defined, given pedagogical and 
practical status and empirical support. Somehow, it has to 
be related to outcomes, to such things as safety, 
satisfaction and self-development, both for doctors and 
patients [48,49] and those outcomes will need to be 
demonstrable. Thomas's theorem [50] states that "If men 
define situations as real, they are real in their 
consequences". Making personhood a central part of the 
`situation' of the clinical encounter is the formidable task 
that faces person-centered medicine. And when PCM 
promises to ground itself in the philosophy of personhood, 
it needs to be clear what that claim means and how 
something so complex and contested can be translated into 
medical reality. 
Respect for persons 
These reflections are important theoretically and help us to 
see that pinning down a theory of personhood, rather than a 
list of its attributes, may be difficult. Personhood is a 
construct with purchase in philosophy, politics, law, 
psychology, sociology, anthropology and common 
discourse. In each of those discursive domains, personhood 
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is assigned attributes that reify it. Yet our interest in 
personhood is in some ways an interest in something about 
humankind to which we assign value in an arbitrary way. If 
we insist that personhood for our purposes is adequately 
defined by the attributes that Cassell privileges in his 
definition, then we are simply declaring that these are the 
(currently) prized attributes of a 'good' and 'flourishing' 
human or at least of a human imbedded in a properly 
oriented culture or society. In the relatively recent past, 
personhood in one culture privileged immaculate Aryan 
ancestry, blue eyes, blond hair and cephalic measurements 
that fell within a certain range. Human beings falling 
outside certain desiderata were considered non-persons. 
Once again, Thomas's theorem reminds us that defining 
situations as real makes them real in their consequences. 
The Nazi era testifies to the truth of the theorem. So we 
must enunciate our normative criteria for personhood with 
great care and still attend to deeper understandings of 
personhood that justify respect for the differences and 
preferences to which Fulford is so sensitive [51-53]. 
Respect is a word that travels as a fellow with 
personhood. Kant made respect for persons central to his 
deontological ethics [54] and that principle has remained 
central to debates about rights and human dignity ever 
since. But the argument is still unsettled whether we owe 
respect to all persons by virtue of their shared 
characteristics (the egalitarian or liberal view) or whether 
we owe it to persons as individuals by virtue of their 
cultural and individual differences (the 'multicultural' 
view [55]). Darwall [56] has introduced a further tension 
into the apparently simple notion of Kantian respect for 
persons, by distinguishing between two kinds of respect. 
Recognition respect is a disposition to give weight to some 
characteristic of the object of respect, simply because it is 
there and the disposition to give it weight has some value 
to the respecting person as a member of a group or culture. 
Respect for other humans qua humans is an example of 
recognition respect. Moral recognition respect is a 
particular version of recognition respect. It expresses the 
normative intuitions and explicit norms that govern the 
attitudes and behaviour of people toward one another in a 
particular culture. Appraisal respect is the attitude of 
hierarchical acknowledgement of the attributes of 
admirable people. Some people are appraised as better than 
others on implicit scales of attributes and achievements in 
such domains as morality, intelligence, physical strength 
and courage. 
Doctors are taught that appraisal respect is both good 
and dangerous. It is good when directed toward mentors 
and role models, but dangerous when it comes to treating 
patients. Doctors should treat everyone equally, whether 
they are a prime minister or a homeless person. 
Recognition respect, particularly in its moral variant, is the 
kind that is relevant to the person in person-centered 
medicine. It is seen as a good in itself, as a Kantian 
imperative, but also as a consequential good because it is 
claimed to produce better care for patients and their 
families. It should therefore benefit everyone involved in 
the care of the ill, carers because they reap the moral 
benefits of respecting persons, patients and their families  
because they experience better relationships, 
communication and outcomes. 
This Utopian structure is built on somewhat uncertain 
foundations. Bird [57] has pointed out — and this relates to 
the earlier point about the dangers of definition by 
normative attributes — that respect for persons is grounded 
far more in a hierarchical system than a purely egalitarian 
one. To respect people by appraisal is of course to 
acknowledge their greater excellence in some particular 
attributes and we do this all the time to our colleagues and 
to the powerful, wealthy, eminent, successful, famous and 
so on. But even to respect by recognition is to 
acknowledge the status of persons as in some way of 
special moral significance. To be accorded the status of an 
equal is a recognition of superiority over the non-human, 
the non-person. And herein lies a danger that brings us 
back to an earlier point about the fragility of personhood. 
All seems well when we can identify Cassell's criteria: 
`embodied, purposeful, thinking, feeling, emotional, 
reflective, relational, human individual always in action, 
responsive to meaning and whose life in all spheres points 
both outward and inward', so that a person's behaviour, 
whether 'volitional, habitual, instinctual or automatic', has 
its genesis from and in meaning.' Things are far more 
problematic when there is something that has a human 
form and the manifestations of life, but has either not yet 
developed these criteria or may be incapable of developing 
them, or has lost them to the entropic forces of time or 
trauma. 
We seem, therefore, to be thrown back to something 
like Schechtman's person-life view, discussed earlier, if we 
are to make full use of the person in person-centered 
medicine. Although the term 'person-life view' fails to 
capture the essence of Schechtman's complex arguments, 
her kind of person-centered animalism seems to express 
something that is intuitively recognisable in the difficult 
clinical contexts where the patient is present, but the 
person is absent in some degree. Some examples will make 
that clear — the foetus and the new-born, the violent 
antisocial psychopath, the genocidal war criminal, the 
decerebrate teenager after a car accident, the young woman 
vegetative after a subarachnoid bleed, the severely 
demented man with Alzheimer's. Can we really claim that 
we as clinicians allow equal moral status to each of these 
people or claim that we make the same therapeutic 
decisions under all conditions for each of them? They are 
clearly persons on the person-life view and deserving of 
moral regard. But as Warren [58] has pointed out, we live 
in a moral world where there is an implicit (and often 
explicit) hierarchy of moral status. We assign respect, 
whether we like it or not, by both recognition and 
appraisal. Doctors climb out of bed to save the lives of 
people they would appraise as being well down on the 
hierarchy of social contribution. They do so because they 
recognise their duty to whatever has human form, whatever 
may live a person-life. They may not approve the life 
trajectory, but humanness falls always within their remit 
because it is with humanness, intuitively recognised and 
acknowledged, that persons begin, develop their 
capabilities and end. And that generalisation applies to 
doctors as well as patients. Doctors are persons, embodied, 
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cognitive, emotional, burdened, tired, challenged morally 
throughout their careers and members of a number of 
sociations with other persons. They, too, are moral patients 
and moral agents, just like their patients. 
So what? 
Person-centered medicine is a great name, but it does run 
the risk, as Miles and Mezzich [2] have acknowledged, of 
suffering the same fate as all the other portmanteau terms 
(EBM, VBM, PCC, humane medicine, narrative-based 
medicine) that have claimed reforming content for their 
portfolios. Miles and Mezzich have argued that person-
centered medicine has particular strength because it 
appeals to the philosophy of personhood [2] and they cite 
Cassell's criteria as their reference point. But as I have 
pointed out, Cassell's criteria assume a theory of the 
person. They express, in other words, some underlying 
theory that justifies picking out these criteria. They look, as 
well, suspiciously like aspirations of Western liberalism: 
`embodied, purposeful, thinking, feeling, emotional, 
reflective, relational, human individual always in action, 
responsive to meaning and whose life in all spheres points 
both outward and inward'. They are fine criteria within 
Western liberal culture; but do they capture the personhood 
of a Buddhist monk leading a contemplative life? Or the 
personhood of someone with Asperger's syndrome whose 
life may be productive and interesting, but unlikely to 
satisfy all of Cassell's criteria? And do they confirm or 
deny the personhood of a severely demented human being? 
They demand some inventiveness if they are to apply 
helpfully and meaningfully to personhood as a reason to 
practise medicine in a particular way. 
Let me therefore suggest some guidelines for 
grounding person-centered medicine: 
1. Medicine deals only with human beings. Non-human 
animals come under the care of other specialties. 
2. Medicine's understanding of personhood covers both 
human animal existence and Lockean cognitive, 
emotional and intentional criteria, such as those 
defined by Cassell. 
3. Healthcare practitioners intuitively invest living 
human form with the capabilities of personhood, 
however, imperfectly those capabilities may be 
expressed. They are moral agents, in other words, 
when they relate to the moral patienthood of an 
anencephalic new-born or to a decerebrate stroke 
patient. 
4. Personhood emerges from the complex systems that 
evolved into human life. It is situated in and 
powerfully shaped by culture and sociation. 
5. Personhood is marked by both gain and loss 
throughout individual human existence. 
6. The person-life view (Schechtman) respects the 
capabilities and the history of any human life form. 
7. Respect is linked to personhood, as both recognition-
respect and appraisal-respect. 
8. Respecting personhood translates into actions that are 
beneficial to patients, families, communities and 
healthcare practitioners and is therefore morally 
desirable. 
9. Personhood, thus articulated, describes intuitions and 
attitudes that are logical for healthcare. It does not 
provide answers to the ethical problems that come 
from those relationships. It may help reflection about 
ethical quandaries, but only as a component of 
reflective equilibrium [32-34]. 
Conclusion 
Pioneers have kick-started person-centered medicine in a 
really impressive way, challenging established discourses 
such as EBM with energy and promise [1,2,59-63]. The 
promises have included a turn to 'the philosophical 
understanding of personhood' [2]. The energy comes from 
the clear and reasoned discourse that develops from a zeal 
to re-personalise medicine. Like all discourses, it will 
develop its way of talking, its situated meanings, its 
symbols of membership and exclusion, its iconic texts and 
so on [64-68]. In the same way, it will lead to critiques and 
counter discourses. Discourses suffer entropy and they 
need sustaining sources of energy. 
Person-centered medicine seeks to do what others have 
sought before, to humanise and personalise the practice of 
medicine, while retaining its essential scientific 
component. The list of those who have had the same goal 
is formidable — Osler [69], Mechanic [70,71], Epstein [72], 
Charon [73,74], Brody [75-77], Frank [78], Montgomery 
[79], Hawkins [80,81], Skrabanek [82] — the list could go 
on and on. Yet it is evidence-based medicine that has 
colonised medical practice — witness the innumerable 
critiques it has spawned [60,83-88], let alone its huge 
literature of support [89-97] — and we have to ask why the 
relational and caring alternatives still struggle for purchase. 
A rich philosophical background to draw on might help 
person-centered medicine to survive and flourish, as it 
deserves. It needs to be something more than yet another 
complement to EBM. 
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